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Abstract	
This	article	analyzes	the	effects	of	patronage	networks	on	cohesion	in	the	armed	forces	of	
the	DRC	(FARDC).	It	shows	that	while	patronage	networks	provide	support	to	individual	
military	personnel,	they	undermine	both	peer	and	commander-subordinate	bonding.	They	
promote	unequal	service	conditions	and	statuses,	and	link	these	to	extra-unit	and	extra-
military	forms	of	social	identification,	which	are	further	reinforced	by	soldiers’	living	and	
generating	revenue	among	civilians.	Furthermore,	they	impair	meritocracy,	and	frustrate	the	
extent	to	which	commanders	live	up	to	their	subordinates’	expectations.	As	they	fuel	
internal	conflicts,	often	around	revenue	generation,	and	foster	bad	service	conditions	and	
distrust	towards	the	political	and	military	leadership,	patronage	networks	also	undermine	
institutional	cohesion.	The	article	concludes	that	cohesion	formation	in	the	FARDC	follows	
different	patterns	than	in	well-institutionalized	and	well-resourced	militaries.	Given	that	
cohesion	impacts	combat	performance	and	norm	enforcement,	these	findings	are	relevant	
for	defense	reform	efforts	and	military	cooperation.		
Key	words:	Armed	forces;	military	cohesion;	patronage;	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	
	
	
Introduction	
The	burgeoning	military	sociological	literature	on	cohesion,	or	bonding	“between	service	
members	and	their	group,	organization,	and	service	institution”	(Siebold,	2007:	288),	has	
been	criticized	for	being	predominantly	grounded	in	research	on	Western	armed	forces	with	
high	degrees	of	legal-bureaucratic	institutionalization	(Käihkö,	2016).	Its	premises	may	
therefore	not	be	fully	applicable	to	armed	forces	in	other	contexts	and	with	other	
characteristics.	In	particular,	it	may	miss	out	on	specific	factors	or	processes	shaping	
cohesion	in	these	militaries.	One	such	factor	is	patronage	networks.	Whereas	patron-client	
relations	can	be	found	in	most	armed	forces,	they	are	much	more	salient	in	certain	militaries	
than	in	others	(Howe,	2001).	A	good	example	of	a	force	where	patronage	networks	shape	
military	functioning	to	a	considerable	extent	is	the	Forces	Armées	de	la	République	
Démocratique	du	Congo	(FARDC,	Armed	Forces	of	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo).	In	
the	FARDC,	formal	command	chains	intersect	and	overlap	with	patronage	networks	that	tie	
military	personnel	via	personal	bonds	of	loyalty	to	particular	patrons-cum-officers,	who	may	
or	may	not	be	their	official	superiors	(Verweijen,	2013).	While	it	is	likely	that	such	ties	affect	
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relationships	between	military	personnel,	there	is	surprisingly	little	research	on	how	they	
impact	cohesion.		
This	article	analyzes	how	patronage	networks	affect	cohesion	within	the	FARDC,	looking	at	
both	the	micro	level	of	primary	(sections,	platoons)	and	secondary	(battalions,	brigades)	
groups,	and	the	meso	level	of	the	armed	forces	as	a	whole.	It	also	explores	macro-level	
influences	on	cohesion,	analyzing	the	wider	socio-political	order	of	which	the	armed	forces	
form	part.	It	finds	that	while	patronage	networks	provide	crucial	support	to	individual	
military	personnel,	they	tend	to	undermine	bonding	between	military	personnel	of	equal	
rank	as	well	as	between	subordinates	and	their	superiors.	By	fostering	differential	treatment	
and	service	conditions,	patronage	ties	accentuate	differences	between	same-rank	military	
personnel,	in	particular	when	these	ties	connect	to	extra-unit	forms	of	social	identification	
(e.g.	ethno-regional	or	ex-rebel	backgrounds).	Patronage	networks	also	impair	meritocratic	
appointments,	and	induce	commanders	to	treat	their	troops	unequally.	Furthermore,	they	
promote	asymmetries	in	wealth	between	commanders	and	their	subordinates,	which	the	
latter	experience	as	disproportionate.	At	the	institutional	level	too,	patronage	networks	
negatively	affect	cohesion.	They	reinforce	parallel	command	chains,	divided	loyalties	and	
competition,	notably	around	access	to	positions	and	resources.	Additionally,	by	promoting	
bad	service	conditions	and	antagonism	towards	the	top	political	and	military	leadership,	
seen	to	be	implicated	in	unscrupulous	revenue	generation	due	to	patronage-related	
pressures,	they	also	undermine	soldiers’	bonding	with	the	military	organization	at	large.	
Identification	with	the	FARDC	is	also	lessened	by	patronage	networks’	crosscutting	
character,	implying	they	encompass	both	soldiers	and	civilians,	and	by	the	Congolese	army’s	
limited	efforts	to	socialize	its	members	into	professional	discourses	and	identities.		
Grasping	the	effects	of	patronage	on	military	cohesion	is	important	for	both	theoretical	and	
policy	reasons.	First,	studying	patronage	networks	deepens	an	understanding	of	the	
processes	and	factors	commonly	identified	to	impact	cohesion	in	military	settings,	including	
their	relative	causal	weight.	It	may	also	provide	new	insights	into	how	other	conditions	that	
often	combine	with	low	levels	of	legal-bureaucratic	institutionalization	affect	military	
cohesion,	such	as	armed	forces’	involvement	in	economic	activities;	their	not	approximating	
a	“total	institution”	(Goffman,	1961;,	and	processes	of	rebel-military	integration.	Second,	
understanding	how	patronage	affects	cohesion	is	crucial	for	guiding	and	assessing	processes	
of	defense	reform,	and	military	collaboration	more	widely.	Cohesion	shapes	both	military	
performance,	and,	by	impacting	norm	enforcement,	soldiers’	behavior	towards	civilians,	
including	their	propensity	to	engage	in	abuses	(Siebold,	2007).	A	better	insight	into	these	
dimensions	of	military	functioning	may	render	reform	efforts	more	effective,	and	may	
facilitate	military-to-military	cooperation,	for	instance,	within	the	framework	of	
peacekeeping	missions.	
The	article	is	structured	as	follows.	The	next	section	discusses	the	concept	of	military	
cohesion,	which	is	followed	by	a	brief	explanation	of	the	employed	methods.	Subsequently,	
a	snapshot	is	provided	of	the	history	of	the	FARDC.	The	next	parts	explore	the	effects	of	
patronage	networks	on	institutional	cohesion,	bonding	between	same-rank	military,	and	
commander-subordinate	bonding,	respectively.	The	concluding	section	offers	reflections	on	
the	theoretical	and	policy	relevance	of	the	findings.		
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Cohesion	in	military	settings	
Within	military	sociology,	views	differ	on	how	cohesion	should	be	defined,	operationalized	
and	measured	(Bartone	et.	al.,	2002;	King,	2013;	Siebold,	1999;	2011).	Attempting	to	
synthesize	decades	of	research	into	a	broad	general	framework,	Siebold	(2007)	proposes	a	
“standard	model	of	military	group	cohesion”.1	For	Siebold,	cohesion	relates	to	a	relationship	
structure	with	both	affective	and	instrumental	dimensions	that	establishes	mutual	trust	and	
loyalty.	This	relationship	structure	impacts	military	conduct	and	motivation	by	facilitating	
collective	action	and	promoting	adhesion	to	group	norms.	It	is	(re)produced	by	both	formal		
and	informal	social	interaction,	which	may	be	either	interpersonal	or	collective.	
Furthermore,	it	encompasses	both	task	and	social	cohesion,	seen	to	partly	overlap	(Siebold,	
2011).	Social	cohesion	relates	to	whether	group	members	like	each	other,	hence	refers	to	
the	nature	and	quality	of	emotional	bonds	of	friendship,	as	based	on	personal	
characteristics.	Task	cohesion,	in	turn,	refers	to	commitment	to	a	common	mission	that	
requires	collective	action	to	accomplish	(MacCoun,	1993).		
In	Siebold’s	model,	cohesion	in	military	organizations	consists	of	four	interrelated	
components.	The	first	two	constitute	primary	group	cohesion	and	consist	of	horizontal	
cohesion	(ties	between	soldiers	at	approximately	the	same	level	of	the	hierarchy);	and	
vertical	cohesion	(relations	between	subordinates	and	their	immediate	commanders).	The	
second	two	constitute	secondary	group	cohesion	and	relate	to	organizational	cohesion	(the	
relations	between	military	personnel	and	their	overarching	unit	of	organization,	like	a	
battalion	or	brigade),	and	institutional	cohesion	(the	relations	between	soldiers	and	their	
overall	organizational	branch	or	the	armed	forces	in	general).		
Military	sociologists	and	other	scholars	have	identified	a	wide	array	of	factors	that	shape	
cohesion,	although	views	on	the	most	relevant	dimensions	and	causal	mechanisms	diverge	
(Bartone	et	al.,	2002;	Siebold,	1999).	To	facilitate	the	analysis	of	how	these	factors	shape	
cohesion	in	the	FARDC,	and	are	influenced	by	patronage	networks,	they	were	regrouped	
into	four	clusters	(for	a	further	elaboration,	see	Verweijen,	2015).		
The	first	cluster	of	factors,	which	shapes	both	peer	and	commander-subordinate	bonding,	is	
named	after	Shils	and	Janowitz’	(1948)	notion	of	“community	of	experience”.	It	relates	to	
the	length	and	characteristics	of	troops’	living,	training	and	operating	together,	hence	
predominantly	to	social	interaction.	Contrary	to	Shils	and	Janowitz’	interpretation	(1948),	it	
excludes	“homogeneity	of	origins”,	based	on	the	consideration	that	while	social	
identification	is	shaped	by	social	interaction,	it	cannot	be	equated	by	it.	“Community	of	
experience”	encompasses	the	following	factors:	1)	exposure	to	common	threats	and	shared	
hardships,	including	in	the	context	of	combat	operations	(Henderson,	1985;	Wesbrook,	
1980);	2)	(the	success	of)	carrying	out	common	tasks,	including	during	training	(Cockerham,	
1978;	MacCoun	et	al.,	2006);	3)	extensive	training	in	the	same	unit	composition	as	during	
combat,	which	allows	for	developing	shared	systems	of	communication	and	routines	(King,	
2006);	and	4)	the	extent	to	which	troops	need	each	other	for	survival	and	the	provision	of	
basic	needs,	like	healthcare,	food	and	clothing.	As	argued	by	Shils	and	Janowitz	(1948),	
where	soldiers	depend	on	civilians	for	satisfying	such	needs,	they	are	less	oriented	towards	
the	primary	combat	unit.		
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The	second	cluster	of	factors,	equally	shaping	both	peer	and	commander-subordinate	
bonding,	was	labeled	“commonality	of	identification	and	beliefs”.	It	draws	inspiration	from	
Henderson’s	(1985:	26)	notion	of	“commonality	of	values”,	which	refers	to	commonalities	in	
ethnic	background,	nationality,	gender,	and	socio-economic	standing	(hence	overlaps	with	
Shils	and	Janowitz’	“homogeneity	of	origins”).	The	terms	“identification”	and	“beliefs”	were	
found	to	be	more	analytically	accurate	than	“values”,	in	part	as	“beliefs”	is	seen	herein	as	a	
wider	category	that	encompasses	worldviews	and	ideologies,	which	also	shape	cohesion	
(Moskos,	1970).	In	recent	years,	scholars	have	pointed	to	the	diminishing	relevance	of	pre-
existing	identities	(such	as	masculinity,	ethnicity,	nationality)	in	the	context	of	the	increasing	
professionalization	of	the	armed	forces	and	a	shift	in	emphasis	towards	task	cohesion	(King,	
2013).	These	findings	indicate	that	the	relative	importance	of	common	forms	of	
identification	in	shaping	cohesion	is	contextual.	For	that	reason,	“commonality	of	
identification	and	beliefs”	is	considered	herein	to	relate	to	the	“(perceived)	salience”	of	
homogeneity	in	terms	of	(ethno-regional)	origins,	language,	worldviews,	and	political-
ideological	and	other	beliefs.	“(Perceived)	salience”	indicates	the	extent	to	which	similarities	
and	differences	are	seen	to	“make	a	difference”	within	formal	and	informal	social	
interaction.	It	is	partly	shaped	by	the	relative	strength	and	significations	of	pre-existing	(i.e.	
before	entering	the	current	military	group)	civilian	and	military	forms	of	identification.	
Certainly,	the	(perceived)	salience	of	identities	is	also	an	outcome,	and	not	only	a	driver	of	
cohesion	formation.	Yet,	it	is	plausible	to	assume	that	where	soldiers	experience	certain	
shared	traits	to	either	bind	or	divide	them,	these	traits	have	also	contributed	to	that	
outcome.		
In	addition	to	“community	of	experience”	and	“commonality	of	identification	and	beliefs”	
bonding	between	troops	and	their	superiors	in	both	primary	and	secondary	groups	is	also	
shaped	by	additional	elements,	here	regrouped	in	the	third	cluster	of	factors.	Since	in	
secondary	groups	in	the	FARDC,	this	cluster	has	preponderant	influence	on	setting	“the	unit	
culture	and	climate	under	which	service	members	live	and	operate	”(Siebold,	2007:	290),	it	
is	considered	to	importantly	shape	organizational	cohesion	herein.	Its	first	component	is	the	
extent	to	which	commanders’	appointment	is	seen	as	legitimate,	which	is	in	part	shaped	by	
respect	for	meritocratic	criteria	(Wesbrook,	1980).	The	second	component	takes	inspiration	
from	Shils	and	Janowitz’s	(1948)	approach	to	identify	characteristics	of	commanders	that	
subordinates	find	desirable.	They	observe	that	in	the	Wehrmacht,	subordinates	bonded	
sooner	with	commanders	when	the	latter	were	trusted,	competent	and	cared	for	the	
wellbeing	of	their	troops,	but	also	disciplined	them	when	needed,	thus	displaying	a	
combination	of	fatherly	benevolence	and	sternness	(Shils	&	Janowitz,	1948).	Taking	into	
account	that	soldiers	of	armed	forces	situated	in	different	socio-cultural	and	military	settings	
might	value	different	command	characteristics,	it	was	decided	not	to	depart	from	a	preset	
range,	but	to	first	identify	what	FARDC	soldiers	perceive	as	desirable	traits	among	
commanders.	Subsequently,	it	was	explored	to	what	extent	commanders	were	experienced	
to	live	up	to	these	expectations.		
The	fourth	cluster	of	factors	relates	to	institutional	cohesion.	As	described	above,	Siebold	
(2007)	interprets	institutional	cohesion	as	relating	to	soldiers’	bonding	with	the	military	at	
large.	Yet	the	term	has	also	been	used	to	refer	to	the	coherence	of	the	military	organization	
as	a	whole	(e.g.	Mora,	2002).	This	second	component	is	also	taken	into	consideration	herein,	
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and	is	seen	to	be	shaped	by	1)	the	extent	to	which	the	military’s	subdivisions	and	units	
collaborate	rather	than	compete;	and	2)	the	extent	to	which	lower	levels	of	the	organization	
are	directed	by	the	official	hierarchy.	The	first	component,	relating	to	soldiers’	bonding,	in	
turn,	is	influenced	by	five	different	factors.	These	include	1)	service	conditions,	like	training	
opportunities	and	arrangements	for	career	progression,	and	2)	perceptions	of	the	legitimacy	
of	the	top	political	and	military	leadership	(Siebold,	2007;	Wesbrook,	1980).	Both	these	
factors	help	give	a	sense	of	purpose	and	meaningfulness	to	soldiers,	thus	enhancing	their	
commitment	to	the	military	organization,	its	mission	and	its	norms	(Siebold,	2007).	Such	
commitment	may	also	be	reinforced	by:	3)	worldviews	and	ideologies,	provided	that	those	
of	soldiers	and	the	military	organization	align	(Wesbrook,1980;	Moskos,	1970);	and	4)	active	
investment	by	the	military	organization	in	socializing	their	members	into	professional	
discourses	and	norms,	and	in	promoting	identification	with	and	allegiance	to	the	
organization	(Arkin	&	Dobrofsky,	1978).	In	order	for	soldiers	to	remain	committed	to	the	
military	organization,	a	final	factor	of	importance	is	5)	that	society	demonstrates	recognition	
of	their	service,	for	instance	in	the	form	of	symbolic	rewards	(Henderson,	1985;	Wesbrook,	
1980).		
	
In	the	following,	it	is	explored	how	the	cohesion-fostering	factors	regrouped	in	these	four	
different	clusters	are	impacted	by	patronage	networks.	Hence,	the	latter	is	not	considered	
an	additional	factor	herein,	but	a	phenomenon	that	influences	the	different	factors	shaping	
cohesion.	But	before	turning	to	this	analysis,	it	is	important	to	clarify	what	is	meant	by	
patronage	networks.	The	latter	are	understood	as	social	networks	cemented	by	patron-
client	ties,	which	are	asymmetric	but	reciprocal	relations	that	have	two	overlapping	
dimensions:	The	first	is	a	dyadic,	personal	relationship,	which	involves	the	granting	of	favors	
and	assistance	by	a	patron	to	an	individual	client	in	exchange	for	support	and	loyalty.	The	
second	dimension	is	a	hierarchical	relationship	between	a	patron	and	a	network	of	clients,	
and	involves	the	exchange	of	collective	goods,	including	symbolic	ones	such	as	
“representation”,	for	(political)	support	and	loyalty	(Erdmann	&	Engel,	2006).	However,	as	
pointed	out	by	Utas	(2012),	patronage	networks	also	contain	more	horizontal	relations	and	
social	ties	formed	on	other	grounds,	like	ethnic,	professional,	religious	or	geographical	
background.	We	should	therefore	conceptualize	such	networks	as	complex,	
multidimensional	webs	of	social	relations.	Moreover,	within	political	orders	qualified	as		
“neopatrimonial”,	patronage	networks	infuse	and	intersect	and	overlap	with	formal	
bureacratic	hierarchies	(Bayart,	2006;	Erdmann	&	Engel,	2006).	In	many	cases,	this	applies	to	
hierarchies	in	both	political	and	military	institutions,	in	part	as	there	is	a	mutual	influence	
between	the	two	(Ikpe,	2000).	For	instance,	rulers’	efforts	to	maintain	control	over	the	
armed	forces	often	follows	patterns	of	co-optation	and	coercion	that	are	heavily	shaped	by	
patronage	logics,	which	in	turn	reinforces	the	salience	of	patronage	within	the	military	
institution	(Howe,	2001).	This	illustrates	how	military	cohesion	is	not	only	shaped	by	factors	
internal	to	the	armed	forces,	but	also	by	the	features	of	the	macro-political	order	of	which	
they	form	part.	
Note	on	methods	
The	data	presented	in	this	article	were	gathered	during	14	months	of	ethnographic	field	
research	conducted	between	2010	and	2012	in	the	eastern	Congo’s	Kivu	provinces	for	a	
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doctoral	thesis	on	civilian-military	interaction.	Semi-structured	interviews	were	held	with	at	
least	400	civilians	and	over	150	military	personnel,	35	of	whom	were	key	informants	that	
were	also	contacted	via	informal	conversations.	A	part	of	this	research	focused	on	military	
cohesion,	considered	important	for	understanding	the	FARDC’s	behavior	towards	civilians.	
The	choice	to	study	the	FARDC	was	informed	by	its	egregious	human	rights	record,	and	
reports	that	its	behavior	towards	civilians	differed	considerably	per	brigade/regiment	and	
per	deployment	context,	allowing	for	exploring	the	factors	shaping	military	behavior	
through	a	comparative	case	study	design.	Furthermore,	the	author	had	lived	and	worked	in	
the	Congo	prior	to	starting	doctoral	research,	which	was	deemed	to	facilitate	data	collection	
and	interpretation.	The	majority	of	the	contacted	military	personnel	belonged	to	the	14	
different	brigades	or	regiments	that	were	selected	as	cases.	In	relation	to	each	unit,	a	range	
of	conditions	shaping	cohesion	was	studied,	such	as	its	trajectory	in	terms	of	genesis,	
training	and	combat	deployment;	its	overall	composition	(military	and	ethno-regional	
background	of	personnel),	and	personnel’s	living	patterns	and	revenue-generation	practices.	
The	selection	of	interviewees	from	the	FARDC	occurred	partly	via	snowball	sampling,	as	a	
degree	of	trust	was	required	to	discuss	sensitive	questions.	Yet	continuing	efforts	were	
made	to	balance	military	from	different	ranks	and	from	various	military,	ethno-regional,	and	
linguistic	backgrounds.	A	more	detailed	description	of	the	used	methods	and	data	collection	
process	can	be	found	in	Verweijen	(2015).		
A	brief	history	of	a	merged	military	
In	2003,	the	belligerents	of	the	Second	Congo	War	(1998–2003)	adopted	a	peace	accord	
based	on	political	and	military	power-sharing.	The	main	warring	factions	agreed	to	
dismantle	their	military	structures	and	send	their	troops	and	officers	into	the	newly	formed	
Integrated	Brigades	and	integrated	command	chain.	The	military	merging	process	was	
however	marred	by	irregularities,	as	the	different	factions	tried	to	retain	a	maximum	of	
influence.	They	often	came	to	constitute	patronage	networks	within	the	FARDC,	although	
some	gradually	dissolved	or	transformed	(Verweijen,	2014).	Another	complicating	factor	
was	the	ex-belligerents’	widely	diverging	military	backgrounds,	encompassing,	inter	alia:	
government	troops	with	decades	of	military	education	and	training,	including	former	
members	of	the	Forces	Armées	Zaïroises	(FAZ),	the	army	under	President	Mobutu	Sese	Seko	
(1965–1996);	military	from	rebel	armies	with	thousands	of	troops	whose	organization	
resembled	that	of	government	forces	and	who	had	received	considerable	training	from	
instructors	of	foreign	or	former	militaries;	and	troops	from	small-scale	militias	known	as	
“Mai-Mai”	with	very	local	spheres	of	influence,	who	had	mostly	learned	by	doing	
(Verweijen,	2014;	2015).		
The	military	integration	process	unleashed	a	scramble	for	ranks	and	positions.	Within	this	
competition,	the	bigger	and	more	powerful	rebel	forces,	notably	the	Rassemblement	
Congolais	pour	la	Démocratie	(RCD),	as	well	as	government	networks	close	to	President	
Kabila,	generally	prevailed.	Both	appointments	and	the	distribution	of	ranks	followed	
political	considerations	rather	than	criteria	of	military	experience	and	competence	(Eriksson	
Baaz	&	Stern,	2010;	Verweijen,	2014).	Consequently,	ex-rebel	officers	with	limited	
experience	and	low	levels	of	military	and	sometimes	general	education	were	awarded	high	
ranks	and	command	positions.	The	same	applied	to	rebels	who	integrated	after	the	initial	
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merger	that	created	the	FARDC,	which	was	a	regular	occurrence	up	to	2013.	These	periodic	
influxes	of	rebels	further	reinforced	non-meritocratic	appointments,	and	the	salience	of	
patronage	networks	formed	along	ex-rebel	lines	(Eriksson	Baaz	&	Verweijen,	2013a).		
	
Deficient	meritocracy	generates	important	frictions	in	the	FARDC’s	day-to-day	functioning,	
as	experienced	and	well-educated	military	personnel	are	often	placed	under	the	command	
of	younger	officers	with	limited	knowledge	of	military	matters,	some	of	whom	are	even	
illiterate	(Eriksson	Baaz	&	Stern,	2010).	A	Non-Commissioned	Officer	(NCO)	explained:		
	
I	am	very	dissatisfied.	I	have	had	a	good	education,	because	I	went	to	the	EFO	[basic	
officer	education	school	during	the	Mobutu	era],	I	know	the	Règlement	militaire	
(military	code	of	conduct)	but	my	superiors	have	not	had	any	education.	They	don’t	
know	anything,	absolutely	nothing.	Even	if	I	greet	them,	I	feel	a	pain	somewhere	in	
my	heart.	
	
Another	officer,	similarly	complaining	about	his	superiors,	said:	“We	call	them	les	profanes	
(the	uninitiated),	since	they	haven’t	had	military	education.	They	are	simply	civilians.”	He	
and	his	colleagues	also	used	the	expression	grades	brusques,	commandement	brutal	(abrupt	
ranks,	brutal	command)	to	describe	ex-rebel	commanders’	alleged	coarseness.	
	
Aside	from	military	background,	the	factions	that	integrated	into	the	FARDC	differed	in	
terms	of	ethno-regional,	linguistic	and	generational	belonging.	Many	ex-government	forces	
are	well-educated	ex-FAZ	officers	who	speak	Lingala	and	originate	from	the	western	part	of	
the	Congo.	They	distinguish	themselves	from	a	younger	generation	of	ex-government	
soldiers	consisting	of	Swahiliphones	from	the	east	who	were	first	recruited	into	the	
insurgency	that	overthrew	Mobutu	in	1997,	or	entered	the	military	in	its	wake	(Verweijen,	
2015).	In	relation	to	the	ex-rebel	forces,	the	main	differences	are	ethno-regional	and	
linguistic.	Most	ex-Mai-Mai	troops	are	Swahiliphones	from	the	east	who	belong	to	ethnic	
groups	that	define	themselves	as	“autochthones”	(the	first/native	inhabitants	of	the	area).	
“Autochthones”	have	tense	relations	with	“Rwandophones”,	who	are	speakers	of	
Kinyarwanda	language	(encompassing	both	Tutsi	and	Hutu)	and	equally	originate	from	the	
east	(Eriksson	Baaz	&	Verweijen,	2013a).		
Rwandophones	dominated	both	the	RCD	and	the	Congrès	National	pour	la	Défense	du	
Peuple	(CNDP),	a	rebel	group	that	integrated	into	the	FARDC	in	2009.	Due	to	their	political	
and	military	weight,	both	these	groups,	which	remained	intact	as	patronage	networks	in	the	
FARDC,	were	privileged	in	the	distribution	of	ranks	and	positions.	When	the	CNDP	joined	the	
FARDC,	the	Integrated	Brigades	were	broken	up,	and	replaced	by	brigades	deployed	under	a	
new	operational	command	created	for	the	Kivu	provinces,	from	2010	onwards	called	“Amani	
Leo”.	The	ex-CNDP	had	preponderant	influence	over	the	Amani	Leo	command,	maintaining	
parallel	systems	of	command,	intelligence,	logistics	and	armament	(UNSC,	2010).	An	effort	
to	reduce	their	influence	in	2011	by	breaking	up	the	operational	brigades	and	creating	
regiments	largely	failed.	It	was	only	in	2012,	when	a	part	of	the	ex-CNDP	deserted	and	
launched	a	new	rebellion,	that	this	network’s	influence	in	the	FARDC	waned	(Eriksson	Baaz	
&	Verweijen,	2013a).	
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While	differences	in	treatment	often	result	predominantly	from	asymmetries	in	political	
weight,	FARDC	personnel	tend	to	ascribe	them	primarily	to	identity,	understood	in	an	
essentialized	manner.	For	instance,	many	former	Mai-Mai	and	ex-government	troops	
attribute	their	alleged	marginalization	in	the	FARDC	to	the	command	chain	being	
“dominated”	by	Rwandophones	(Eriksson	Baaz	&	Verweijen,	2013a).	In	the	words	of	an	
NCO:	“The	Banyamulenge	[a	Rwandophone	Tutsi	group]	officers	always	want	to	dominate	
the	Bantu	[considered	autochthones].	They	impose	themselves,	they	always	want	to	be	the	
chief.	This	is	why	there	are	conflicts	here	in	the	east.”	Rwandophones,	in	turn,	in	particular	
Tutsi	military	personnel,	also	feel	discriminated	against	in	the	military.	A	former	FARDC	
company	commander	testified:		
When	you	get	into	trouble	with	your	subordinates,	it	suddenly	matters	that	you	are	
a	Tutsi.	I	was	closely	monitoring	my	soldiers.	They	were	engaging	in	all	sorts	of	illicit	
business	like	extortion	and	cheating,	putting	up	barriers	and	producing	alcohol	(…)	
One	evening	I	called	them	to	explain	they	should	change	their	behavior	but	they	got	
angry.	The	next	days	they	were	whispering	behind	my	back.	Then	one	evening	three	
of	them	came	up	to	me	saying:	‘if	you	do	not	tone	down,	you	Tutsi,	we	will	shoot	
you’.	How	can	I	serve	in	such	a	military?	
In	sum,	rebel-military	integration	reinforced	the	importance	of	patronage	networks	within	
the	FARDC.	The	effects	on	cohesion	were	fourfold:	first,	being	linked	to	power	asymmetries,	
ex-rebel	patronage	networks	created	differences	in	treatment	and	service	conditions,	
therefore	affecting	“community	of	experience”;	second,	this	overlap	with	power	
asymmetries	rendered	the	differences	in	identification	that	marked	ex-rebel	networks	more	
salient,	thus	impacting	“commonality	of	identification	and	beliefs”;	third,	rebel-military	
integration	undermined	the	perceived	legitimacy	of	the	appointment	of	commanders	of	
both	primary	and	secondary	groups;	and	fourth,	by	fostering	power	competition	and	parallel	
command	chains,	as	well	as	undermining	trust	in	the	military	top	leadership,	it	weakened	
institutional	cohesion	(Verweijen,	2015).	
Effects	on	institutional	cohesion:	conflicts,	parallelisms	and	bad	soldiering	
Rebel-military	integration	is	not	the	only	factor	contributing	to	limited	institutional	cohesion	
in	the	FARDC.	In	fact,	the	most	important	patronage	network	in	the	FARDC	is	not	an	ex-rebel	
force	but	emanates	from	the	presidential	military	office,	the	maison	militaire.	This	office	
controls	much	of	the	core	general	staff	and	ministry	of	defense	functions,	including	
procurement,	logistics,	military	intelligence,	the	presidential	guard	and	appointments	to	key	
positions.	It	also	has	“clients”	among	commanders	of	the	most	important	brigades	or	
regiments,	occasionally	giving	them	orders	while	bypassing	the	regular	command	chain	(the	
general	staff	in	Kinshasa	and	the	commands	of	the	defense	zones	and	military	regions)	(ICG,	
2006).		
The	maison	militaire	promotes	measures	that	lead	to	constant	re-appointments	of	
command	and	staff	functions,	including	frequent	re-organizations	(e.g.	the	creation	of	the	
Amani	Leo	structures	and	the	regiments).	The	reasons	for	this	are	twofold.	First,	frequent	
rotations	of	office	prevent	officers	from	building	up	an	autonomous	power	position,	thus	
keeping	them	dependent	on,	and	hence	loyal	to,	the	presidential	circle.	Second,	the	flux	
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resulting	from	constant	changes	in	positions	fosters	ongoing	competition	between	different	
patronage	networks.	This	competition	keeps	the	military	divided,	and	therefore	prevents	it	
from	becoming	a	threat	to	the	president’s	power	(Verweijen,	2015;	cf.	Bayart,	2006).		
A	key	stake	in	this	ongoing	competition	is	access	to	income-generation	opportunities.	Many	
top	officers	in	the	FARDC	are	involved	in	a	wide	range	of	economic	activities,	like	
import/export	trade,	natural	resources	exploitation,	or	real	estate	(Verweijen,	2013;	UNSC,	
2010).	Enrichment	in	the	higher	echelons	encourages	revenue	generation	lower	down	the	
command	chain,	in	part	as	it	leads	to	the	embezzlement	of	funds	destined	for	the	rank	and	
file,	such	as	money	for	healthcare	and	rations.	At	the	same	time,	soldiers’	wages	are	very	
low	(around	$100	a	month,	which	does	not	allow	for	maintaining	even	a	small	family),	and	
there	are	no	social	services	or	benefits,	like	family	assistance.	Soldiers	even	have	to	partly	
pay	for	basic	items	and	services	themselves,	such	as	transport	for	rotations	and	healthcare.	
Consequently,	they	solicit	such	services	from	civilians,	but	at	much	lower	tariffs,	and	
sometimes	without	paying.	Due	to	the	scarcity	of	barracks	and	tents,	FARDC	troops	also	
have	to	arrange	their	own	accommodation,	generally	staying	in	rooms	and	houses	rented	
from	civilians.	To	finance	these	expenses	and	maintain	a	basic	standard	of	living,	soldiers	
engage	in	revenue	generation,	both	individually	(e.g.	petty	trade)	and	with	their	units	(e.g.	
illegal	taxation	at	roadblocks	and	mining	sites).	Superiors	commonly	oblige	their	
subordinates	to	cede	a	part	of	the	collectively	generated	revenues.	Each	commander,	in	
turn,	has	to	transmit	a	share	of	that	money	to	their	own	patrons	higher	up	in	the	hierarchy.	
Not	obeying	this	imperative	is	potentially	costly,	as	it	can	lead	to	being	dismissed	or	
transferred	to	other,	less	lucrative	jobs	or	areas	(Eriksson	Baaz	&	Verweijen,	2013b;	
Verweijen,	2013;	2015).		
The	drive	for	revenue	generation	sparks	conflicts	between	patronage	networks.	Patrons	try	
to	influence	appointments	of	both	themselves	and	their	clients,	striving	for	command	
positions	and	deployment	to	lucrative	areas,	like	mining	sites	or	border	posts.	However,	they	
can	withdraw	their	support	for	such	deployment	any	moment,	or	be	overruled	by	rivals,	
causing	their	clients	to	lose	their	position	and	income.	The	ever-present	possibility	of	a	
sudden	loss	of	position	prompts	military	personnel	to	accumulate	the	maximum	of	
resources	while	they	can	(Verweijen,	2013).	Additionally,	ongoing	power	struggles	may	drive	
officers	to	exploit	their	official	position,	for	instance	by	manipulating	the	military	justice	
system.2	To	be	shielded	against	the	resulting	political	and	economic	insecurity,	military	
personnel	are	prompted	to	solicit	protection	from	powerful	patrons,	who	can	influence	the	
military	leadership	and	military	justice	system	(Eriksson	Baaz	&	Verweijen,	2013b;	cf.	Chabal	
&	Daloz,	1999).		
Conflicts	and	competition	between	patronage	networks	do	not	only	undermine	institutional	
cohesion,	but	also	have	detrimental	effects	on	operational	effectiveness,	as	they	hamper	
collaboration	and	information-sharing.	Moreover,	the	preoccupation	with	revenue	
generation	diverts	both	attention	and	resources	from	military	duties	(UNSC,	2010).	
Additionally,	the	urge	to	promote	factional	influence	and	business	interests	often	induces	
collusion	with	armed	groups,	leading	for	instance	to	information	leaks	and	the	conclusion	of	
informal	“non-aggression	pacts”	(Eriksson	Baaz	&	Verweijen,	2013a;	UNSC,	2010).	
Enrichment	by	the	higher	echelons	and	superiors’	collusion	with	enemy	forces,	in	
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combination	with	poor	service	conditions,	also	undermine	soldiers’	combat	motivation.	
Many	soldiers	hesitate	risking	their	lives	for	an	institution	that	neglects	them,	or	for	
superiors	believed	to	be	in	cahoots	with	the	enemy	(Eriksson	Baaz	&	Verweijen,	2013a).	
These	sentiments	point	to	military	personnel’s	weak	bonding	with	the	military	institution,	
the	second	form	of	institutional	cohesion	described	above.	An	important	cause	of	this	
weakness	is	discrepancies	between	idealized	notions	of	soldiering	and	the	lived	experiences	
of	serving	in	the	FARDC.	Congolese	soldiers’	conceptualizations	of	“good	soldiering”	revolve	
around	dignity,	morality,	order	and	discipline,	including	respect	for	the	hierarchy.	Another	
central	notion	is	patriotism,	reflected	in	soldiers’	understanding	of	their	mandate	as	
“defending	the	country’s	territorial	integrity	and	protecting	the	population	and	their	goods”	
(Eriksson	Baaz	&	Stern,	2008;	Verweijen,	2015).	These	various	ideals	are	to	be	realized	
through	education,	training	and	good	living	and	service	conditions.	This	idealized	image	of	
soldiering,	however,	is	almost	diametrically	opposed	to	soldiers’	lived	realities	(Eriksson	Baaz	
&	Stern,	2008).	In	everyday	life,	FARDC	personnel	experience	to	belong	to	the	poorest	
segments	of	society,	to	operate	in	disorganization	and	with	variable	discipline,	to	have	
limited	access	to	training	and	education	and	few	prospects	of	social	mobility,	and	to	serve	in	
an	organization	where	parochial	interests	rather	than	self-sacrifice	for	the	fatherland	
dominate	(Verweijen,	2015).		
The	discrepancies	between	soldiering	as	it	is	and	soldiering	as	it	should	be	cause	FARDC	
personnel	from	all	backgrounds	to	feel	disappointed,	disillusioned,	neglected,	and	
disrespected	by	the	military	organization	(see	also	Eriksson	Baaz	&	Stern,	2008).	As	a	popular	
expression	in	the	FARDC	goes:	Nous	avons	des	militaires,	mais	pas	d’armée	(we	have	soldiers	
but	no	military).	A	substantial	part	of	the	FARDC	personnel	interviewed	indicated	they	would	
rather	leave	military	service,	provided	they	had	the	means	and	possibility	to	find	alternative	
sources	of	income	–	which	most	said	they	had	not.	In	the	absence	of	pensions	(rules	for	
which	exist	on	paper,	but	are	not	implemented),	the	difficulty	to	find	alternative	income	also	
keeps	those	ripe	for	retirement	in	active	service.	A	60-year-old	ex-FAZ	soldier	explained:	
“The	Congolese	military	is	like	corvée	(forced	labor)	and	one	is	forced	to	stay	there	until	
death.”	In	spite	of	the	alleged	difficulties	to	leave	the	military,	desertion	rates	appear	to	be	
high	(Verweijen,	2015).	This	points	not	only	to	low	institutional	cohesion,	but	also	to	low	
levels	of	bonding	with	the	primary	and	secondary	group	(Griffith,	2002;	Henderson,	1985).		
	
Another	factor	that	undermines	institutional	cohesion	in	the	FARDC	is	the	experienced	
limited	societal	appreciation	for	the	FARDC.	As	a	corporal	explained:	
		
Being	a	soldier	is	to	sacrifice	oneself.	It	is	a	work	of	sacrifice.	You	die	because	of	
people	that	you	do	not	know.	But	civilians	have	an	easy	life.	Despite	the	deaths,	the	
population	doesn’t	accept	you,	doesn’t	appreciate	you.	And	if	you	quit,	the	
population	doesn’t	accept	you	either.	We	will	always	be	seen	like	malfaiteurs	
[wrongdoers].	
	
An	important	reason	for	civilians’	disrespect	for	the	FARDC	is	soldiers’	penchant	to	extract	
money,	goods	and	services	from	them	(Eriksson	Baaz	&	Stern,	2008),	which	is	an	indirect	
consequence	of	patronage-induced	duties	to	generate	resources	at	different	levels	of	the	
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hierarchy.	Engagement	in	frantic	resources	generation	is	also	at	the	root	of	soldiers’	dislike	
of	the	political	leadership	in	Kinshasa,	held	responsible	for	soldiers’	miserable	living	
conditions	by	embezzling	funds,	in	collaboration	with	the	highest	echelons	of	the	military.	
Additionally,	both	political	and	military	elites,	part	of	the	same	patronage	networks,	are	
believed	to	manipulate	war	for	the	purposes	of	self-enrichment.	These	beliefs,	which	are	
captured	in	the	widely	circulating	expression	bakonzi	basi	bateki	mboka	na	bango,	bolingi	
biso	tosala	nini	(the	leadership	has	sold	out	the	country,	what	can	we	subordinates	do?),	
indicate	that	political	and	military	elites’	objectives	are	perceived	to	be	at	cross-purposes	
with	soldiers’	professed	ideology	of	patriotism	(Verweijen,	2015).	The	result	is	feelings	of	
purposelessness	and	alienation,	which	nourish	hostility	towards	the	political	and	military	
leadership.	One	way	in	which	this	hostility	is	expressed	among	officers	is	fantasizing	about	
overthrowing	the	government.	An	intelligence	officer	stated:		
	
The	current	government	is	a	disaster.	We	have	to	replace	the	current	president.	
That	cannot	be	too	difficult.	Me,	I	am	ready.	It	takes	nothing	to	take	Bukavu	[capital	
of	South	Kivu	province].	Some	rocket	launchers,	a	bit	of	light	artillery,	and	some	
disciplined	troops.	That’s	all.		
	
Limited	bonding	with	the	military	organization	is	aggravated	by	the	FARDC’s	lack	of	efforts	to	
socialize	its	troops	into	formal	professional	discourses	and	identities.	Since	the	FARDC	was	
formed,	most	soldiers	have	received	little	training	and	education,	which	is	only	for	new	
recruits.	Furthermore,	soldiers	rarely	get	into	contact	with	FARDC	personnel	outside	of	their	
secondary	group,	as	most	brigades	or	regiments	are	permanently	deployed	on	the	
frontlines.	Additionally,	medals	or	honors	are	rare,	and	there	are	no	mottos	or	songs	specific	
to	the	FARDC	(Verweijen,	2015).	At	the	same	time,	due	to	their	embedding	into	patronage	
networks	that	encompass	civilians,	but	also	the	dependency	on	and	intermingling	with	
civilians	to	fulfill	needs	like	accommodation	and	revenue	generation,	military	personnel	is	
strongly	exposed	to	extra-military	forms	of	identification	(Verweijen,	2015).	Thus,	they	have	
spheres	of	living	and	working	that	are	partially	separate	from	the	military	unit,	hence	do	not	
entail	the	co-presence	of	colleagues.	This	gives	the	FARDC	a	less	“total”	character	as	an	
institution	(cf.	Goffman,	1961).	Patronage	networks	also	contribute	to	this	outcome	in	a	
more	direct	way,	as	they	lower	the	influence	of	the	formal,	bureaucratic	administration	on	
regulating	military	personnel’s	lives,	seen	as	a	crucial	feature	of	total	institutions		(Davies,	
1989).		
	
Effects	on	horizontal	cohesion:	survival	solidarity	and	survival	patronage	
The	patronage	networks	that	FARDC	soldiers	are	embedded	in	diverge	in	strength,	scope,	
cohesiveness	and	the	nature	of	the	social	interaction	that	they	regulate.	Where	military	
patrons	are	powerful,	they	are	able	to	provide	significant	services	to	their	clients,	like	
influencing	their	appointments	and	deployments.	Where	they	are	weaker,	they	may	not	be	
able	to	influence	the	military	hierarchy	on	important	decisions,	but	still	help	their	clients,	for	
instance	by	granting	them	access	to	revenue-generating	opportunities	in	their	personal	
businesses	(Verweijen,	2015).	Hence,	patronage	networks	shape	soldiers’	living	and	service	
conditions,	but	not	in	equal	degree.	The	result	is	inequalities	between	personnel	serving	in	
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the	same	unit,	provided	they	are	part	of	different	patronage	networks,	which	is	most	often	
(but	not	always)	the	case.		
These	inequalities,	which	are	generally	less	pronounced	among	the	lowest	ranks,	have	an	
important	impact	on	“community	of	experience”,	which	in	the	FARDC	largely	centers	on	
basic	needs	provision	and	sharing	the	hardships	of	daily	life.	FARDC	soldiers	in	the	same	
primary	unit	help	each	other	with	basic	tasks	like	constructing	shelter,	searching	for	
firewood	and	water,	and	small-scale	revenue	generation	(e.g.	charcoal	production).	Such	
social	interaction	generates	forms	of	“despair	solidarity”	(Bilakila,	2004,	p.23),	or	pragmatic	
and	practically	oriented	solidarity	that	revolves	around	mutual	assistance	in	the	struggle	for	
survival.	Even	though	its	effects	are	undermined	by	the	frequent	breakup	of	brigades	due	to	
reorganizations,	such	solidarity	fosters	horizontal	cohesion.	Commenting	on	the	hardships	
they	experienced	in	the	camp	where	they	were	mixed	with	rebel	forces,	one	NCO	said:	
“Despite	some	difficulties,	people	always	manage	(…)	People	suffered,	but	that	did	not	
disturb	the	education.	This	is	military	endurance	(…)	It	has	contributed	to	developing	esprit	
d’équipe	(team	spirit).”	Hence,	similar	to	what	Moskos	(1970)	observed,	cohesion	in	the	
FARDC	has	an	instrumental	dimension,	being	in	part	an	outcome	of	self-interest	in	the	
struggle	for	survival.	However,	where	self-interest	requires	loyalty	to	networks	outside	one’s	
unit,	attention	from	and	commitment	towards	one’s	peers	is	deflected.	Given	the	harsh	
conditions	in	the	FARDC,	support	from	such	patronage	networks,	however	limited,	is	often	
crucial	to	ensuring	that	soldiers	remain	committed	to	their	job.	Hence	paradoxically,	while	
patronage	networks	weaken	institutional	cohesion,	they	ultimately	also	help	prevent	the	
military	from	falling	apart	(Verweijen,	2015).		
One	reason	why	basic	needs	provision	plays	a	central	role	in	fostering	cohesion	among	lower	
ranks	in	the	FARDC	is	that	the	other	two	dimensions	of	“community	of	experience”(training	
and	common	tasks)	have	limited	or	ambivalent	effects.	As	mentioned,	training	in	the	FARDC	
is	rare.	Furthermore,	while	troops	regularly	conduct	military	tasks	together,	including	
military	operations,	the	impact	on	peer	bonding	is	mixed	(Verweijen,	2015).	In	some	cases,	
frontline	experiences	reinforce	comradeship.	For	instance,	soldiers	of	a	platoon	who	
displayed	a	considerable	level	of	mutual	bonding	highlighted	their	pride	in	having	carried	
out	operations	against	the	rebel	group	Forces	Républicaines	Fédéralistes	in	the	cold	and	
impenetrable	Bijabo	forest	in	South	Kivu.	Aside	from	shared	hardships,	these	operations	
promoted	comradeship	through	common	dislike	of	“the	enemy”,	who	was	in	this	case	of	
Tutsi	origins,	while	the	unit	members	identified	themselves	as	“Bantu”	(non-Tutsi).	Yet	in	
other	cases,	joint	military	operations	were	observed	to	sow	discord	and	division,	especially	
when	ending	in	failure	and	when	soldiers	already	distrusted	one	another.	In	such	situations,	
mistakes	and	a	(perceived)	lack	of	efforts	evoked	the	suspicion	of	backstabbing	and	betrayal.	
One	soldier	related	for	instance	how	his	unit	had	lost	the	way	during	an	offensive	against	a	
Mai-Mai	group	due	to	wrong	directions	given	by	an	ex-Mai	Mai	unit	member,	which	elicited	
suspicion	he	was	in	connivance	with	the	enemy,	even	though	he	had	belonged	to	a	different	
Mai-Mai	group.		
	
Distrust	among	soldiers	is	particularly	high	where	soldiers	in	the	same	primary	unit	are	tied	
into	competing	patronage	networks	that	are	linked	to	antagonistically	defined	identity	
categories,	a	situation	that	impacts	“commonality	of	identification	and	beliefs”.	Differences	
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in	identification	also	become	more	salient	where	the	associated	patronage	networks	offer	
high	levels	of	protection,	causing	pronounced	inequality	in	service	conditions	and	statuses	
among	group	members.	In	such	cases,	identities	become	markers	of	perceived	favoritism	
and	power	inequalities,	and	start	working	as	a	divisionary	mechanism	(Verweijen,	2015).	For	
instance,	one	NCO	from	the	western	Congo	commented	on	his	colleagues:	“The	soldiers	
[from	the	west]	have	now	such	a	bad	reputation	that	they	[soldiers	from	the	east]	say	
‘Lingala	is	the	language	of	thieves	(ya	bavoyoux)’.	They	have	turned	against	the	
basemalingala	(those	who	speak	Lingala)”.	At	the	moment	he	pronounced	these	words,	the	
regiment	of	which	he	was	part	was	subject	to	important	conflicts,	as	the	members	from	one	
specific	ex-rebel	network	used	their	dominance	in	the	command	to	favor	their	own	group.	
	
Effects	on	vertical	and	organizational	cohesion:	mauvais	père	de	famille	
The	factors	constituting	“community	of	experience”	and	“commonality	of	identification	and	
beliefs”	do	not	only	undermine	horizontal	cohesion,	but	also	affect	bonding	between	
subordinates	and	commanders	both	in	primary	and	secondary	units,	albeit	sometimes	in	
slightly	different	ways	or	degrees.	For	instance,	the	frequent	breakup	of	units	harms	
community	of	experience	even	stronger	in	the	case	of	commander-subordinate	relations,	as	
it	forces	troops	to	adjust	each	time	to	new	command	styles.	In	the	words	of	a	sergeant:	
	All	the	time	changes	is	not	good,	because	we	are	not	stable.	A	chef	knows	the	
behavior	of	his	soldiers	and	the	soldiers	know	their	chef	and	that	eases	the	work	(…).	
There	are	many	changes	but	one	commander	is	soft,	the	other	one	is	strict,	so	we	do	
not	know	how	to	adapt	ourselves.	
Both	“community	of	experience”	and	“commonality	of	identification	and	beliefs”	interact	in	
complex	manners	with	the	two	other	elements	that	shape	superior-subordinate	bonding.	
These	are	first,	the	perceived	legitimacy	of	commanders’	appointment	and	second,	the	
extent	to	which	commanders	live	up	to	their	subordinates’	expectations.	Both	of	these	are	
negatively	affected	by	patronage.	As	described	above,	when	commanders	are	appointed	or	
promoted	due	to	their	patronage	connections	rather	than	due	to	merit,	the	perceived	
legitimacy	of	their	appointment	is	undermined.	One	officer	described	it	as	follows:	“The	
FARDC	is	still	very	hierarchical,	ranks	continue	to	be	of	influence,	but	they	do	no	longer	
automatically	give	a	certain	respect”.		
The	effects	of	non-meritocratic	appointments	on	cohesion	are	aggravated	by	their	impact	on	
“community	of	experience”.	When	commanders	are	perceived	to	be	incompetent	and	
inexperienced,	joint	tasks	and	activities	might	foster	conflicts,	distrust	and	irritations,	rather	
than	cohesion	(Verweijen,	2015).	This	applies	particularly	to	combat	operations	leading	to	
defeat,	failure,	or	casualties–negative	experiences	that	are	often	blamed	on	commanders’	
lack	of	competence,	or	their	doubtful	loyalty	and	motivations.	Suspect	loyalty	is	most	often	
invoked	when	commanders	belong	to	certain	identity	groups	that	are	distrusted,	pointing	to	
interaction	effects	with	“commonality	of	identification	and	beliefs”.	Ultimately,	such	
aggravated	distrust	may	lead	to	insubordination	(Eriksson	Baaz	&	Verweijen,	2013a).	A	
former	NCO	explained:		
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It	is	extremely	difficult	to	carry	out	badly	given	orders	for	professional	military.	We	
say:	‘a	badly	given	order	might	not	be	executed’,	especially	when	it	causes	many	
deaths.	For	example,	if	you	fight	against	Rwandans	[i.e.	a	certain	Rwandan	rebel	
group],	you	will	know	that	at	some	point	they	will	outflank:	therefore	you	need	to	
send	two	sections	to	the	sides.	However,	if	the	commanding	officer	does	not	know,	
he	will	send	all	troops	straight	ahead	but	they	will	be	encircled	by	the	enemy.	We	
know	this	from	experience,	but	our	commander	went	ahead	and	then	many	troops	
died.	When	this	happened	we	rebelled	against	him	and	withdrew.	
	
Causing	unnecessary	casualties	frustrates	the	expectations	that	FARDC	soldiers	have	vis-à-vis	
those	enacting	the	role	of	“commander”,	which	are	largely	the	same	for	commanders	of	
primary	and	secondary	groups.	For	FARDC	soldiers,	commanders	should	uphold	high	moral	
standards,	constitute	role	models–	which	also	implies	giving	troops	fair	and	equal	
treatment–	and	demonstrate	commitment	to	the	unit’s	common	goals	(Eriksson	Baaz	&	
Stern,	2008;	Verweijen,	2015).	As	a	corporal	stated:	“Being	a	good	commander	is	like	being	a	
pastor,	he	is	first	a	model	for	his	troops”.	Furthermore,	soldiers	expect	commanders	to	be	
educated	and	competent,	not	least	to	reduce	risks	on	the	battlefield.	As	a	lieutenant	said:	“A	
commander	must	be	educated.	It	is	like	in	medicine,	you	first	have	to	master	the	theory	
before	you	can	do	the	practice.	On	the	basis	of	practice	alone	you	cannot	make	a	diagnosis.”	
Additionally,	soldiers	want	commanders	to	have	father-like	and	protective	qualities,	
including	by	assuring	subordinates’	primary	needs,	but	also	by	demonstrating	sternness	and	
disciplining	troops	firmly	but	fairly	when	needed.	These	expectations	are	often	expressed	in	
paternal	metaphors,	like	that	a	commander	should	be	a	bon	père	de	famille	(good	head	of	
the	household).	
	
As	has	already	become	clear,	FARDC	officers	rarely	live	up	to	these	idealized	expectations	of	
commanding.	In	the	words	of	one	soldier,	an	FARDC	commander	is	often	a	“mauvais	père	de	
famille”	(bad	head	of	the	household).	Patronage-related	pressures	are	an	important	cause	of	
such	deficient	performance.	Commanders	simultaneously	have	obligations	towards	their	
hierarchy,	their	troops,	their	clients	and	their	patrons,	having	to	provide	the	latter	with	
regular	financial	contributions	to	maintain	their	position.	Yet,	they	also	use	the	resources	
appropriated	from	their	subordinates	for	purposes	of	self-enrichment,	causing	immense	
asymmetries	in	wealth,	and	signifying	limited	commitment	to	soldiers’	wellbeing,	and	to	the	
unit	and	its	goals.	As	a	lieutenant	stated:		
The	wife	of	the	deputy	commander	lives	next	to	the	wife	of	the	colonel,	because	she	
has	nothing	to	eat.	And	when	he,	who	has	a	big	house,	gives	orders,	do	you	think	
that	he	who	has	nothing	is	going	to	obey?	(…)	The	distances	between	the	high-
ranking	and	the	low-ranking	are	simply	too	big	(…)	They	cheat	us.	We	have	nothing,	
absolutely	nothing	(…)	I	have	a	bad	cough	but	not	even	enough	money	to	get	
medicine.	They	will	not	even	give	you	a	paracetamol	[pain	killer]	when	you	are	sick.	
No	nothing,	not	even	a	single	Franc	congolais	[Congolese	currency]!	They	do	not	
care	if	we	die.	
Another	way	in	which	commanders	are	seen	to	frustrate	the	expectations	surrounding	their	
role	is	unequal	treatment	of	subordinates.	Due	to	the	high	level	of	de	facto	decentralization	
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in	the	force,	FARDC	commanders,	in	particular	at	brigade,	regiment	and	battalion	level,	have	
significant	leeway	to	shape	their	subordinates’	living	and	working	conditions.	They	make	for	
instance	decisions	on	leave,	assigned	tasks	(which	determine	levels	of	income),	and	
transport	possibilities.	While	there	are	formal	rules	and	regulations	to	manage	these	
dimensions	of	service,	these	are	rarely	enforced	(Verweijen,	2015).	Consequently,	
commanders	can	deploy	the	granting	and	withholding	of	what	they	consider	“favors”	(which	
in	some	other	militaries	would	be	defined	as	“rights”)	as	bargaining	chips	in	their	relations	
with	subordinates.	Such	a	high	level	of	discretion	allows	commanders	to	favor	those	in	their	
personal	patronage	networks,	instead	of	following	predictable	criteria	of	performance	and	
compliance.	The	result	is	that	the	other	subordinates	feel	disadvantaged.	They	often	frame	
such	perceived	marginalization	in	identity-related	terms,	indicating	that	“commonality	of	
identification	and	beliefs”	is	at	play.	For	instance,	after	stating	he	was	marginalized	by	his	
Rwandophone	commander,	an	ex-FAZ	officer	declared:	“I	would	no	longer	call	this	an	army.	
Everything	is	negotiable.	Openly,	there	is	no	tribalism,	but	behind	the	scenes,	it	is	very	
strong”.		
The	problem	of	preferential	treatment	can	also	be	found	in	relation	to	practices	of	
disciplining	and	punishment.	Commanders	may	be	more	lenient	towards	their	own	favorites	
in	the	unit	as	well	as	towards	subordinates	that	are	embedded	in	other,	more	powerful	
patronage	networks.	The	latter	may	interfere	in	commanders’	disciplining	practices	to	
protect	their	clients,	for	instance	by	asking	them	not	to	refer	a	case	to	the	military	
prosecutor’s	office	(Eriksson	Baaz	&	Verweijen,	2013b).	Such	practices	promote	discontent	
not	only	towards	commanders,	but	also	towards	colleagues,	as	those	who	have	transgressed	
are	not	punished	according	to	the	rules.	In	this	manner,	patronage	interference	in	
disciplining	also	undermines	horizontal	cohesion.		
Concluding	remarks:	Theoretical	and	policy	implications	
This	article	has	analyzed	how	patronage	networks	that	overlap	and	intersect	with	formal	
command	chains	undermine	cohesion	in	the	Congolese	armed	forces,	both	in	primary	and	
secondary	groups	and	at	the	level	of	the	military	as	a	whole.	The	findings	demonstrate	that	
cohesion	formation	in	the	FARDC	follows	different	patterns	than	in	other	militaries,	both	
due	to	the	relevance	of	patronage	networks	and	a	number	of	other	conditions	that	enhance	
these	networks’	salience.	For	instance,	due	to	poor	and	irregular	work	and	living	conditions,	
assistance	with	basic	needs	provision	and	regulating	elementary	dimensions	of	service	has	a	
pronounced	impact	on	cohesion.	The	same	applies	to	extensive	engagement	in	revenue	
generation,	which	fosters	internal	conflicts,	and	promotes	collaboration	with	enemy	forces	
and	civilians.	Obviously,	in	well-resourced	and	well-institutionalized	armies,	and	those	that	
do	not	engage	in	economic	activities,	cohesion	is	not	or	less	influenced	by	these	factors.		
Another	particularity	of	the	FARDC	is	that	it	less	approximates	a	“total	institution”	than	
some	other	militaries.	It	possesses	limited	infrastructure	and	facilities	of	its	own,	causing	
soldiers	to	live	among	civilians,	and	undertakes	minimal	efforts	to	socialize	its	members	into	
common	discourses	and	identities.	A	final	cohesion-impacting	condition	not	always	found	in	
other	militaries	is	rebel-military	integration,	which	may	reinforce	parallel	power	structures	
and	undermine	meritocracy.	While	this	combination	of	elements	may	be	specific	to	the	
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FARDC,	armed	forces	in	many	other	contexts	share	at	least	some	of	these	features.	For	
instance	both	rebel-military	integration	and	military-economic	involvement	occur	in	
militaries	across	the	world,	and	have	in	many	cases	demonstrated	to	have	detrimental	
effects	on	military	cohesion	(Brömmelhorster	&	Paes,	2003;	Licklider,	2014).	Comparative	
research	on	the	processes	and	conditions	shaping	military	cohesion	is	therefore	warranted.	
Grasping	these	processes	and	conditions	is	not	merely	of	theoretical	importance,	but	is	also	
relevant	for	defense	reform	efforts	and	military	collaboration.	Studying	the	effects	of	
patronage	on	cohesion	provides	insights	into	wider	power	dynamics	in	armed	forces	and	
sheds	light	on	soldiers’	combat	performance	and	behavior	towards	civilians.	Understanding	
these	dimensions	facilitates	military-to-military	collaboration,	like	in	the	context	of	
peacekeeping	operations	or	joint	security	activities	between	peacekeeping	forces	and	host-
country	military.	For	instance,	the	United	Nations	peacekeeping	mission	in	the	Congo	
conducts	joint	military	operations	and	patrols	with	the	FARDC–activities	that	do	not	always	
run	smoothly	in	part	because	peacekeepers	have	limited	insight	into	the	workings	of	the	
Congolese	army	(Verweijen,	2017).	Improving	combat	performance	and	behavior	towards	
civilians	also	tends	to	occupy	center	stage	in	defense	reform	efforts	(Howe,	2001).	Yet	these	
efforts	do	not	always	pay	much	attention	to	cohesion.	In	the	FARDC,	they	have	mostly	been	
directed	towards	the	training	of	a	few	rapid	reaction	battalions,	with	each	donor	training	
them	according	to	their	own	military	doctrines,	which	has	undermined	interoperability	and	
institutional	cohesion	(ICG,	2006	;	Stearns,	Verweijen	&	Eriksson	Baaz,	2013).	
To	be	more	effective,	defense	reform	initiatives	must	pay	attention	to	strengthening	
cohesion	through	measures	like	reinforcing	meritocracy	(by	codifying	and	enforcing	clear	
criteria	for	appointments	and	promotions)	and	training	units	in	the	same	doctrine	and	in	the	
same	composition	as	they	will	be	deployed	in	combat	(cf.	King,	2006).	Furthermore,	defense	
reform	should	work	towards	regularizing	and	guaranteeing	soldiers’	service	conditions,	to	
reduce	leeway	for	favoritism	and	insecurity	among	military	personnel.	This	insecurity	is	a	
main	incentive	for	soldiers	to	seek	protection	from	patrons	in	the	first	place,	leading	them	to	
reinforce	the	very	patronage	networks	that	are	at	the	root	of	their	predicament	(cf.	Chabal	
&	Daloz,	1999).	Ensuring	soldiers’	basic	rights	is	therefore	a	precondition	for	breaking	the	
vicious	cycle	of	insecurity	and	patronage,	although	it	is	by	no	means	a	guarantee.		
	
Notes	
																																								 																				
1
	For	criticism	on	the	“standard	model”	see	King,	2007	and	Siebold,	2011.		
2	Although	the	military	justice	apparatus	is	independent	on	paper,	in	reality,	it	is	strongly	influenced	
by	the	FARDC	command	(Eriksson	Baaz	&	Verweijen,	2013b).	
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